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Previous research has revealed that intuitive confidence is an important predictor of how people 
choose between intuitive and non-intuitive alternatives. Two studies were conducted to 
investigate the determinants of intuitive confidence. Across these studies participants predicted 
the outcomes of several National Basketball Association games, both with and without reference 
to a point spread. As predicted, after controlling for the variability associated with point spread 
magnitude, the faster participants were to predict the outright winner of a game (i.e., generate an 
intuition), the more likely participants were to predict the favourite against the point spread (i.e., 
endorse the intuition). Overall, my findings point to the speed of intuition generation as a 
determinant of intuitive confidence, and thus a predictor of choice in situations featuring intuitive 
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While many people hold their intuitions in high regard, there are times when our 
intuitions oppose the information presented to us. For example, a person may have a “good” 
feeling about an investment that is deemed unfavourable by their financial advisor or wish to go 
see a movie that has received negative reviews online. How do people decide between intuitive 
and non-intuitive alternatives when faced with information that conflicts with their intuitive 
choice? According to Simmons and Nelson (2006), people resolve such choice conflict situations 
by considering two factors: (1) The confidence they hold in their current intuition (i.e., intuitive 
confidence) and (2) the strength of information opposing this intuition. In a host of studies, 
Simmons and Nelson were able to demonstrate how participants were more likely to choose in 
accord with their intuition when choice situations produced confidently held intuitions and 
featured weak opposing information. Conversely, when intuitive confidence was low and the 
information undermining the intuitive choice strong, participants’ preferences for intuitive 
choices disappeared. 
Making Predictions Against Point Spreads 
 Simmons and Nelson (2006) investigated intuitive choice primarily in a sports betting 
domain. This domain is useful for such investigations as it commonly features an intuitive 
alternative (i.e., the superior team), a non-intuitive alternative (i.e., the inferior team), and a point 
spread designed to equate the validity of both choices. Therefore, the current study also utilizes a 
sports betting domain to study intuitive choice under conflict. 
 In the current study, participants were asked to predict the outcome of several National 
Basketball Association (NBA) games. Two types of predictions were asked of participants. First, 
participants were asked to predict the winners of games given a set of statistical cues that 
signified the quality of the two otherwise anonymous teams. These predictions (referred to as 
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WIN predictions) are simple in that a correct prediction entails the participant correctly 
identifying which team will have more points at the end of the game. Second, participants were 
asked to predict the winner of games against a point spread (referred to as ATS predictions). 
These predictions are more complex in nature as the correct prediction is not always one in 
favour of the winning team. Rather, the point spread serves to equate the likelihood of either 
team “winning” in the context of a bet and does so by subtracting points from the team deemed 
most likely to win the game (referred to as the favourite). For example, imagine you wish to 
place a bet on an NBA game featuring the dominant Cleveland Cavaliers and the lowly 
Philadelphia 76ers. Based on the quality of both teams, a bookkeeper decides that the Cleveland 
Cavaliers are an overwhelming favourite in this match-up and sets the point spread at 12 points. 
This means that a bet placed on the Cleveland Cavaliers pays out if the Cavaliers win this match-
up by 13 or more points. However, if the Philadelphia 76ers win the game or the Cleveland 
Cavaliers win the game by 11 or less points a bet placed on the 76ers is declared a winner (if the 
Cavaliers win the game by exactly 12 points neither bet is declared a winner). Thus, what was 
once an easy decision (to bet on the Cleveland Cavaliers) due to the inequality of the two teams 
becomes difficult with the introduction of a point spread. 
Explaining Choice Under Conflict in a Sports Betting Domain 
 Past research has shown that people prefer to predict favourites against the point spread, 
despite favourites failing to win against point spreads more often than underdogs (Paul & 
Weinbach, 2008; Simmons & Nelson, 2006). Simmons and Nelson demonstrated how this 
preference for favourites was dependent on how much confidence participants had in their 
intuitive choice. Specifically, when a vast majority of participants selected a “favourite” to defeat 
an “underdog” participants were more likely to choose the favourite against their own self-
generated point spreads. Conversely, participants did not demonstrate this preference for games 
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that lacked a clear favourite (as indicated by parity in participants’ WIN predictions). The same 
pattern of results was observed when examining participants’ self-reported confidence in their 
WIN predictions. When participant’s confidence in a WIN prediction was high they were more 
likely to choose the team they deemed the favourite against their self-generated point spread, 
however, when participant’s confidence in a WIN prediction was low no consistent preference 
for selecting favourites emerged. Lastly, the influence of point-spread magnitude on participants’ 
ATS predictions was observed in a set of additional studies featuring authentic point spreads, 
with participants being less likely to choose favourites in ATS predictions as point spreads 
increased. 
 To explain this pattern of responding it is helpful to employ a dual-systems approach, 
which posits two distinct mental systems – System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
According to a dual-systems approach, people often answer difficult questions by substituting in 
an easier but related question (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Thus, when faced with having to 
make a prediction against a point spread people may opt to make this prediction by first making 
a simpler prediction, that is, a prediction regarding which team will win the game. When making 
this easier prediction (“Who will win the game?”) the favourite often springs to mind quickly 
and effortlessly. According to Simmons and Nelson (2006), the decision-maker will then 
consider the magnitude of the point spread along with the confidence they possess in their 
intuition in order to arrive at a decision. If confidence in the intuition is high and the point spread 
magnitude low, the decision-maker will likely choose the intuitive alternative and predict the 
favourite to win against the point spread. If however, intuitive confidence is low and the point 
spread magnitude high, the decision-maker is likely to favour the non-intuitive choice and 




The Current Study 
 Simmons and Nelson (2006) were able to reliably demonstrate the important role 
intuitive confidence plays in resolving conflict between an intuitive alternative and information 
that opposes this intuition. Nevertheless, the determinants of intuitive confidence have yet to be 
examined. What causes an intuition to be confidently held and consequently favoured over an 
equally valid non-intuitive alternative? The primary goal of the current study is to advance 
Simmons and Nelson’s account of intuitive choice under conflict by exploring this very question. 
 Prior to making an ATS prediction, participants in Simmons and Nelson’s (2006) 
experiments were asked to provide a WIN prediction. Since favourites are selected a vast 
majority of the time in WIN predictions, it is possible that having people first predict the winner 
of a game increases confidence in favourites, thus leading to more favourite ATS predictions 
(i.e., for games featuring clear favourites). In Experiment 1, I investigate the potential influence 
of participants making WIN predictions immediately prior to ATS predictions by comparing the 
ATS predictions of participants who made (WIN/ATS Condition) and did not make (ATS Only 
Condition) WIN predictions. If making a WIN prediction immediately prior to an ATS 
prediction does bias participants to predict more favourites against the spread, one would expect 
favourite ATS predictions to be more frequent in the WIN/ATS Condition compared to the ATS 
Only Condition. 
 Previous studies have demonstrated a link between fast, fluent memory retrieval and 
confidence (Kelly & Lindsay, 1993; Morris, 1990; Nelson & Narens, 1980), with people 
reporting more confidence in answers they retrieved quickly. Additionally, other studies have 
demonstrated the impact of metacognitive experiences (such as disfluency) on peoples’ choices 
in a variety of contexts (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, 2007; Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & 
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Schwarz, 1999; Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Thus, one possible determinant of 
intuitive confidence is how quickly and easily an intuition springs to mind.  
 In Experiment 2, I investigate the relationship between the speed at which participants 
can arrive at an intuitive choice (i.e., make a WIN prediction) and participants’ ATS predictions. 
I predict that the faster participants are able to predict the winner of a game the more likely they 
will be to predict the favourite against the point spread for that game. Overall, if fast intuition 
generation leads to confidently held intuitions, one would expect to observe this negative 
relationship between WIN prediction response times and favourite preferences in ATS 
predictions due to the previously demonstrated positive relationship between intuitive confidence 
and favourite bias in ATS predictions (Simmons & Nelson, 2006). Similarly, if fluent intuition 
generation leads one to experience high confidence in the intuitive choice (e.g., to predict the 
favourite) one would expect faster WIN predictions to correlate with the frequency of 
participants predicting the favourite to win the game. Consequently, I predict that games 
featuring a high proportion of favourite WIN predictions will be more likely to feature fast WIN 
predictions. Overall, if the above hypotheses are supported, it would suggest a relationship exists 
between how fast one can arrive at an intuitive response, how confident they are in this intuitive 
response, and how likely they are to choose in accord with this intuition in the face of opposing 





 The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the influence of having participants 
make WIN predictions immediately prior to ATS predictions. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions. Those in the WIN/ATS Condition made both WIN and ATS 
predictions for each presented NBA game. Meanwhile, those in the ATS Only Condition only 
provided ATS predictions. The comparison of these two groups ATS predictions served as the 
focus of Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. A sample of 413 participants was recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
to complete an online questionnaire. Participants were recruited under the condition that they be 
U.S. residents and possess a Mechanical Turk HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 95%. 
The present experiment took approximately 10 minutes to complete and participants were 
compensated $0.50 for their participation. All reported experiments received prior approval by 
the University of Waterloo, Office of Research Ethics. 
 Materials and Procedure. Participants completed an online questionnaire that had them 
predict the outcome of 24 NBA games played in the 2014-15 NBA season. Games were included 
on the basis that they were played between February 19, 2015 and February 22, 2015. This date 
range was selected as it ensured that each team had played a minimum of 50 games during the 
current NBA season and thus that their quality could be reliably demonstrated through various 
statistics (e.g., win-loss record). Artificial point spreads were then calculated via a regression 
analysis. Authentic point spreads retrieved for each game through a sports betting website 
(www.donsbest.com) were employed as my dependent variable. Next, three independent 
variables were calculated and included in my regression analysis. These three independent 
variables were as follows: Win percentage difference (Home team win percentage - Visiting 
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team win percentage), points scored difference (Home team points scored per game - Visiting 
team points scored per game) and points allowed difference (Home team points allowed per 
game - Visiting points allowed per game). These independent variables were related to three of 
the four statistical cues presented to participants prior to them making their predictions in 
Experiment 1. An independent variable based on the Home/Away record cue was not included in 
my regression analysis due to the fact that this cue did not lend itself to a fair comparison 
between home and visiting teams (i.e., one would expect home win-loss records to be better than 
visiting win-loss records). Finally, unstandardized predicted values were obtained from this 
regression analysis and used as point spreads in Experiment 1. By using these artificial point 
spreads, I ensured that only the data presented to participants would influence a game’s point 
spread. Some games played in between this date range output a point spread lower than 1.5 and 
thus were not included in Experiment 1 due to the fact that they lacked a clear favourite. 
Following the removal of such games, I arrived at a set of 24 NBA games, which were featured 
in Experiment 1 (see Appendix A for the full list of stimuli). 
 Prior to making any predictions, participants completed a point spread tutorial that 
informed them how point spreads operate in a sports betting domain. To ensure that each 
participant understood this knowledge, two questions were administered following the point 
spread tutorial. Each question required that participants correctly select the winner of a bet made 
against a point spread. Only the 300 participants who correctly answered both questions were 
able to proceed in this experiment. 
 Participants in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
WIN/ATS Condition (N = 144) participants were asked to make both WIN (“Which team do you 
believe will win the game?”) and ATS (“Which team do you believe will win against the 
spread?”) predictions. In the ATS Only Condition (N = 156), participants only made ATS 
 
 8 
predictions. Four statistical cues were presented in a table format, each helping to highlight the 
overall quality of the otherwise anonymous teams (see Figure 1). The presented cues were as 
follows: 1) Record 2) Home/Away Record 3) Points Scored Per Game and 4) Points Allowed Per 
Game. These cues informed participants of the frequency of wins and losses for an anonymous 
team (Record), the frequency of wins and losses specific to when a team was the Home or Away 
team (Home/Away Record), the quality of a team’s offense (Points Scored Per Game) as well as 
the quality of a team’s defense (Points Allowed Per Game). Following each prediction, 
participants rated how confident they were in their prediction(s) on a 9-point scale, ranging from  
1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). These confidence data are not included in the following analyses.1 
  
                                                
1 Analyses featuring participants’ self-reported confidence data did not appear in the present thesis 
due to these analyses not being relevant to the primary focus of Experiment 1. However, 
participants’ self-reported confidence data was analyzed and a number of Simmons and Nelson’s 
(2006) findings were replicated. First, I observed a strong positive relationship between 
participants’ WIN prediction confidence and the frequency of favourite WIN predictions (r(21) = 
.799, p < .001). Second, WIN prediction confidence was shown to be a significant predictor of 
participants’ ATS predictions (b = 25.65, t(20) = 10.30, p < .001), with favourites being more likely 
to be predicted as WIN prediction confidence increased. Lastly, participants demonstrated more 
confidence when predicting the favourite (M = 5.86) compared to the underdog (M = 5.47) while 





Figure 1. Presentation of Cues in Experiment 1. Cue table presented to participants in 
Experiment 1 outlining a match-up between two anonymous teams. Values in table represent the 
cues provided for one game in Experiment 1. 
 
 Data Analysis. Prior to analyzing the data, I set out to remove any games from the 
analyses in which the underdog was perceived as the superior team by a majority of participants. 
Such games are problematic as for more than half of participants, the presented point spread only 
serves to bolster a prediction on what is already perceived as the stronger team. Consequently, I 
removed one game from the final analyses as, for this game, 82% of participants predicted the 
underdog to defeat the favourite. Following the removal of this game, the final analyses 
consisted of predictions made to 23 NBA games. 
Results & Discussion 
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the influence of having participants 
make WIN predictions immediately prior to ATS predictions. To this end, I was unable to find 
any evidence that having participants first predict the winner of a game biased a future prediction 
made against a point spread. That is, participants’ point spread predictions did not significantly 
differ between conditions (t(44) = -.785, p = .437). Specifically, 59.8% of point-spread 
predictions in the WIN/ATS Condition were for the favourite compared to 63.9% in the ATS 
 Home Team  Visiting Team  
Record 30-23  20-33 Record 
Home Record 15-10  8-19 Away Record 
Points Scored Per Game 99.2  100.7 Points Scored Per Game 
Points Allowed Per Game 97.2  104.1 Points Allowed Per Game 
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Only Condition. Furthermore, participants in Experiment 1 displayed a preference for predicting 
favourites against the point spread, as they did so 61.9% of the time. This percentage was 
significantly greater than the chance expectation of 50% (t(45) = 4.49, p < .001). Overall, 
favourites were predicted by the majority of participants against the spread for 18 out of 23 





 The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate the relationship between the speed 
at which participants are able to generate an intuitive choice (i.e., make a WIN prediction) and 
participants’ choices for WIN and ATS predictions. Participants were once again randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions. Those in the WIN Condition exclusively made WIN 
predictions while those in the ATS Condition only made ATS predictions. Participants’ response 
times in the WIN Condition were aggregated and a median response time for each game was 
calculated. Furthermore, the proportion of participants selecting the favourite in the WIN 
Condition and the ATS Condition was also calculated on a per game basis. First, I hypothesized 
a negative relationship between WIN prediction response times and the proportion of favourites 
being selected in WIN predictions, such that games featuring fast responses will be associated 
with a high number of predictions for the favourite. Second, I hypothesized a negative 
relationship between WIN prediction response times and the extent of favourite bias in 
participants’ ATS predictions such that the faster participants can generate an intuitive response 
(i.e., make a WIN prediction) the more strongly favourites will be preferred against a point 
spread. 
Method 
 Participants. A sample of 418 participants was recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and was rewarded with 50 cents upon completion of an eight-minute online questionnaire. All 
participants were recruited under the condition that they be U.S. residents and keep a 95% (or 
greater) HIT approval rate on Mechanical Turk. 
 Materials and Procedure. Participants in Experiment 2 were asked to predict the 
outcomes of 20 NBA games. These 20 games were randomly selected for each participant out of 
a pool of 44 NBA games that were played between February 19, 2015 and February 25, 2015. 
 
 12 
Artificial point spreads were calculated in an identical manner to Experiment 1. Games that 
generated a point spread less than 1.5 were not included in Experiment 2 due to these games 
lacking a decisive favourite. Following the removal of such games, I arrived at a set of 44 NBA 
games, which were featured in Experiment 2 (see Appendix B for the full list of stimuli). 
 As in Experiment 1, participants were administered a point spread tutorial followed by 
two questions that required knowledge of point spreads. Only the 339 participants who correctly 
answered both questions were able to proceed in this experiment. 
 Participants in Experiment 2 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
WIN Condition (N = 162) participants were asked to predict the winners of each presented game 
(“Which team do you believe will win the game?”). In contrast, participants assigned to the ATS 
Condition (N = 177) made all of their predictions against a provided point spread (“Which team 
do you believe will win against the spread?”). Immediately following each prediction, these 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in their prediction on a 9-point scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). However, participants self-reported confidence data are not 
included in the subsequent analyses.2 Three statistical cues informed participants’ predictions, as 
these cues highlighted the overall quality of the otherwise anonymous teams (see Figure 2). 
These cues were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with the exception that the Home/Away 
Record cue was removed in order to simplify the presentation of cues for participants. 
Nevertheless, the three statistical cues used in Experiment 2 informed participants of the 
frequency of wins, as opposed to losses, for an anonymous team (Record), the quality of a team’s 
                                                
2 Replicating the results of Simmons and Nelson (2006) and Exp. 1, participants’ self-reported more 
confidence when predicting the favourite (M = 6.00) compared to the underdog (M = 5.44) when 
making ATS predictions (t(172) = 7.37, p < .001). Once again, this analysis was not reported in the 








Figure 2. Presentation of Cues in Experiment 2. Cue table presented to participants in 
Experiment 2 outlining a match-up between two anonymous teams. Values in table represent 
cues provided for one game in Experiment 2. 
 Home Team  Visiting Team  
Record 30-23  20-33 Record 
Points Scored Per Game 99.2  100.7 Points Scored Per Game 
Points Allowed Per Game 97.2  104.1 Points Allowed Per Game 
 
 Data Analysis. As in Experiment 1, I set out to remove games in which the underdog was 
perceived as the superior team by a majority of participants. In Experiment 2, one game fit this 
criterion and thus was removed from all further analyses. Therefore, my final analyses included 
predictions made to 43 NBA games. 
Results & Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for 
predicting favourites against the point spread, doing so 62.9% of the time. This percentage was 
significantly greater than the chance expectation of 50% (t(42) = 5.18, p < .001). Furthermore, 
this preference resulted in favourites being predicted against the spread by the majority of 
participants for 31 out of 43 games. 
 Two additional hypotheses were investigated in Experiment 2. First, I hypothesized a 
negative relationship between WIN prediction response times and the frequency of favourite 
WIN predictions, such that games featuring fast WIN predictions would be more likely to feature 
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a greater proportion of favourite WIN predictions. In order to measure the speed of participants’ 
WIN predictions, I analyzed the median response times for each game in the WIN Condition. 
This was done on a per game basis by amassing all WIN prediction response times for a 
particular game and then calculating a median response time. Thus, a median response time was 
calculated for all 43 games analyzed in Experiment 2. Similarly, I assessed the proportion of 
participants who selected the favourite in WIN predictions for each game in the WIN Condition. 
It is important to note that, for all analyses presented below, games were used as the unit of 
analysis (as opposed to subjects). As predicted, WIN prediction response times shared a 
significant negative relationship with participants’ favourite preferences in WIN predictions (r = 
-.423, p < .01), with games featuring high proportions of favourite WIN predictions being more 
likely to possess a fast WIN prediction median response time (compared to games featuring 
fewer favourite WIN predictions). Second, I sought to examine the relationship between the 
speed at which WIN predictions were made and participants’ ATS predictions. I hypothesized 
that the faster participants made a WIN prediction in the WIN Condition, the more likely 
participants in the ATS Condition would be to predict the favourite for that game against the 
spread. I regressed the proportion of favourite ATS predictions for each game on (a) point spread 
magnitude and (b) WIN prediction median response times. As shown in Table 1, my hypothesis 
was supported. That is, after controlling for the variability associated with point spread 
magnitude, the faster WIN predictions were made in the WIN Condition the more likely 
participants were to predict favourites against the spread in the ATS Condition. Additionally, 
point spread magnitude was shown to share a strong negative relationship with participants ATS 
predictions. That is, after controlling for WIN prediction response times, people were less likely 





Effect of Independent Variables for ATS Predictions in Experiment 2 
 
Note. Data represents the output of a regression analysis conducted featuring games as the unit of 
analysis. The percentage of favourite ATS predictions for each game was used as the dependent 
variable and was predicted by the median WIN prediction response times for each game in the 
WIN Condition (WIN prediction RT) along with point spread magnitude. 
  
Predictor Variable B SE Beta (Standardized) p <  
WIN prediction RT -.059 .029 -.307 .05 




 The current study investigated intuitive choice under conflict in a sports betting domain, 
with a primary focus on examining the relationship between the speed of intuition generation and 
peoples’ preferences for intuitive versus non-intuitive alternatives. Replicating the findings of 
previous research (Paul & Weinbach, 2008; Simmons & Nelson, 2006), participants 
demonstrated a clear preference for predicting favourites against the spread in both Experiments 
1 and 2. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Experiment 1, the magnitude of this preference was 
not influenced by whether participants first made WIN predictions. Thus, it appears that having 
people first select the winner of a game does not enhance their preference for favourites against 
the point spread. It is possible that people implicitly predict the winner of a game, regardless of 
whether this prediction is explicitly asked for, in order to simplify the complex question they are 
tasked with (making an ATS prediction). This is an open question, but nevertheless, is a claim 
that fits well within a dual-process framework (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
 In Experiment 2, I investigated the relationship between WIN prediction response times 
and participants’ WIN predictions. I predicted that a significant negative relationship would exist 
such that games featuring fast WIN predictions would be associated with a greater proportion of 
predictions for the favourite to win the game. This hypothesis was supported in Experiment 2, 
with the predicted negative relationship being observed. Furthermore, I tested the hypothesis that 
the faster participants made a WIN prediction in the WIN Condition, the more likely participants 
in the ATS Condition would be to predict the favourite for that game against the spread. This 
hypothesis was also supported in Experiment 2 with WIN prediction response times sharing a 
significant negative relationship with the frequency of favourite ATS predictions when the 
variability associated with point spread magnitude was controlled for. 
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 Overall, these findings suggest an important relationship between the speed at which an 
intuition comes to mind, the confidence that an intuition is held with, and how a conflict between 
an intuitive and non-intuitive choice is resolved. These results are consistent with the claim that 
intuitions that are generated fluently may be held more confidently and thus be more likely to be 
endorsed in choice conflict situations. However, further studies need to be done in order to 
validate this claim. For example, studies in which the fluency of intuition generation is directly 
manipulated can be undertaken to investigate the casual effects of intuition fluency on intuition 
confidence and choices under conflict. Such an investigation would be meaningful as there are 
many factors in the everyday world that serve to disrupt fluency while simultaneously keeping 
the nature and strength of information for and against an intuitive alternative unchanged. For 
example, a poorly written or hard-to-read opinion piece may elicit less preference for intuitive 
responding from a decision-maker compared to an opinion piece that is well written or easy-to-
read, yet is identical in content. Similarly, choices involving abstract or complex components, 
such as choosing a stock to invest in, may also produce less intuitive responses due to a lack of 
intuitive fluency and consequently intuitive confidence. The answers to these questions are 
dependent on future empirical study. 
Conclusion  
 The current study expanded on the findings of Simmons and Nelson (2006) by 
investigating two potential determinants of intuitive confidence. First, Experiment 1 
demonstrated that having participants explicitly predict the winner of a game does not bias them 
to make the same selection against a point spread. That is, participants who made WIN 
predictions prior to ATS predictions were no more likely to predict the favourite against the 
spread compared to participants who made only ATS predictions. Additionally, in Experiment 2, 
I was able to provide evidence of a relationship between the speed at which an intuition comes to 
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mind and how conflict between an intuitive and non-intuitive choice is resolved. Specifically, the 
speed of participants’ intuitive responding in the WIN Condition was shown to be a significant 
predictor of participants’ choices under conflict in the ATS Condition. Overall, the data collected 
suggests that the speed of intuition generation may act as a determinant of intuitive confidence 
and thus play an important role in how people resolve conflict between intuitive and non-
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Appendix A: Experiment 1 Stimuli 

























17-39 7-18 95.7 101.7  27-26 10-16 99.8 99.7 -4 
12-41 7-19 89.8 100.5  21-33 10-19 95.8 97.2 -5 
43-11 25-3 103.4 96.8 -6 36-17 15-8 105.6 100.7  
10-43 7-19 92.5 100.2  22-30 13-15 92.8 96.6 -3.5 
33-21 20-8 99.7 97.3 -1.5 33-22 12-13 102.2 99.3  
11-42 6-21 97.5 106.1  29-25 13-14 105.9 104.7 -6.5 
30-23 15-10 99.2 97.2 -10 20-33 8-19 100.7 104.1  
36-20 17-9 106 101 -3 36-17 18-9 103.1 99.8  
19-34 10-15 95.7 98.2  36-17 13-12 102.6 97.3 -7 
13-40 7-18 99.1 106.2  21-31 11-16 95.5 99.5 -3 
42-9 23-2 110.6 99.6 -5.5 34-20 14-13 100.9 97.1  
22-30 13-15 94.3 96.9  29-25 12-17 100.7 98.6 -1.5 
23-30 9-15 93.1 96.4 -1.5 27-27 10-17 99.6 99.6  
34-21 15-11 102 99.1 -7.5 29-26 13-15 106 104.9  
36-18 18-8 103.1 100 -2 37-17 16-8 105.6 100.4  
36-19 22-7 107 101 -11 19-34 7-17 100.2 104.2  
10-44 7-20 92.4 100.4  34-22 13-13 102.6 99.1 -10 
31-23 16-10 99 96.9  43-12 18-8 103 97 -3 
22-33 11-18 98.3 99.6  33-22 13-13 99.5 97.9 -2 
18-39 8-18 95.6 101.4 -6.5 12-42 5-22 89.9 100.6  
22-33 11-14 96 97.2  43-9 19-7 110.6 99.6 -8.5 
30-25 17-8 102.1 97.2 -9.5 20-34 8-20 100.3 103.8  
37-20 18-9 106.1 101 -7.5 22-31 9-15 94.5 97.1  





Appendix B: Experiment 2 Stimuli 

















17-39 95.7 101.7  27-26 99.8 99.7 -3.5 
12-41 89.8 100.5  21-33 95.8 97.2 -3.5 
43-11 103.4 96.8 -5 36-17 105.6 100.7  
10-43 92.5 100.2  22-30 92.8 96.6 -3 
33-21 99.7 97.3 -2.5 33-22 102.2 99.3  
11-42 97.5 106.1  29-25 105.9 104.7 -6.5 
30-23 99.2 97.2 -7.5 20-33 100.7 104.1  
36-20 106 101 -2 36-17 103.1 99.8  
19-34 95.7 98.2  36-17 102.6 97.3 -6 
13-40 99.1 106.2  21-31 95.5 99.5 -1.5 
42-9 110.6 99.6 -7.5 34-20 100.9 97.1  
33-23 99.3 98  43-10 110.3 99.7 -4.5 
34-21 102 99.1 -4.5 29-26 106 104.9  
35-19 106.7 100.7 -2.5 34-19 100.7 96.7  
36-19 107 101 -10.5 19-34 100.2 104.2  
10-44 92.4 100.4  34-22 102.6 99.1 -8.5 
31-23 99 96.9  43-12 103 97 -2.5 
22-33 98.3 99.6  33-22 99.5 97.9 -2.5 
18-39 95.6 101.4 -5.5 12-42 89.9 100.6  
22-33 96 97.2  43-9 110.6 99.6 -9 
30-25 102.1 97.2 -8 20-34 100.3 103.8  
37-20 106.1 101 -8.5 22-31 94.5 97.1  
13-41 99.2 106.3  20-32 100.8 102.4 -2 
21-33 98.3 99.8  34-20 102.2 99.1 -3.5 
23-31 93.1 96.6 -8 12-43 90.1 100.7  
28-27 99.7 99.5  37-18 105.1 100.3 -2 
 
 23 
35-21 102.1 99.2 -3.5 31-24 98.8 96.9  
37-18 103 99.6 -14 12-42 97.8 106.2  
20-34 95.7 97.7  34-21 100.9 97.4 -4 
29-27 106 105 -5.5 20-33 101 102.7  
23-33 98.4 99.4  35-22 102.6 98.8 -3 
31-25 101.2 98.6 -5.5 23-33 96.2 97.2  
38-20 105.9 100.7 -2.5 37-19 104.9 100.3  
44-12 102.9 96.8 -4.5 39-20 105.8 100.5  
21-33 101.3 102.9 -7.5 10-45 92.3 100.5  
36-21 101.9 98.7 -7.5 22-32 94.2 97  
38-18 103.2 99.6 -2 37-20 106.9 100.7  
31-25 98.3 96.7 -12 12-44 90.4 101  
12-43 97.9 106.3  33-24 99.4 98.3 -7.5 
29-27 99.7 99.4 -5 23-31 96.1 99.3  
20-36 99.9 104.2  29-28 106.1 105.2 -2 
21-34 95.6 97.4 -6.5 14-41 99.5 106.4  
19-35 100.2 104.6  41-14 100.3 95.5 -8 
36-19 101.9 97.2 -3.5 34-22 100.5 97.3  
 
